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NOTES
THE WAGE PRIORITY ISSUE: FORMULA FOR CONSENSUS
Whether certain fringe benefits won through collective bargaining
are entitled to the priority granted "wages . . . due to workmen" under
the Bankruptcy Act' is a question which has provoked considerable dis-
agreement in both the courts and legal literature.2 In a recent decision,
Joint Industry Board of the Electrical Industry v. United States,' the
United States Supreme Court construed the Act restrictively to deny
priority to trustees' claims against a bankrupt employer for unpaid con-
tributions to an employees' annuity fund. In rejecting the priority claim,
the Court relied exclusively on United States v. Embassy Restaurant,
Inc.,4 in which an employer's contributions to a union welfare fund estab-
lished through collective bargaining similarly were held not entitled to
priority.
The legislative history of the priority section offers scant support to
those who would construe narrowly the scope of its protection.5 On the
contrary, the trend since the wage priority was first granted in 1841 has
been to broaden progressively the class of protected workers.6  Such
1. Section 64(a) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964), provides:
The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors,
and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and the order of payment,
shall be . . . (2) wages and commissions, not to exceed $600 to each claimant,
which have been earned within three months before the date of the com-
mencement of the proceeding, due to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling
or city salesmen on salary or commission basis, whole or part time, whether
or not selling exclusively for the bankrupt; and for the purposes of this
clause, the term 'traveling or city salesmen' shall include all such salesmen,
whether or not they are independent contractors selling the products or services
of the bankrupt on a commission basis, with or without a drawing account or
formal contract....
2. See Forman, Priority of Union Welfare Funds as Wages in Bankruptcy, 62
CoM. L.J. 321 (1957); 34 CI.-KENT L. Rv. 235 (1956); 6 DUKE B.J. 121 (1957);
26 FORDHIAmt L. REv. 561 (1957); 19 GA. B.J. 107 (1956); 57 Mica. L. REv. 403
(1959); 42 MINN. L. Rv. 294 (1957); 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 681 (1957); 32 TEmp. L.Q.
332 (1959) ; 20 U. PiTT. L. REv. 115 (1958); 44 VA. L. Rlv. 995 (1958); 13 VAND. L.
REV. 376 (1959) ; 66 YAIE L.J. 449 (1957).
3. 391 U.S. 223 (1968).
4. 359 U.S. 29 (1959).
5. For a detailed examination of the history of the Act, see 3 W. CoLLIR,
COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §§ 64.01, 64.201 (14th ed. J. Moore 1967).
6. Priority for debts up to a maximum of twenty-five dollars for labor performed
within six months of the bankruptcy was first granted as a third-class claim under the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841. Act of August 19, 1841, 5 Stat. 445. The Act of 1867 increased
the sum available to fifty dollars for wages due an operative, clerk or house servant.
Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 529. A major revision in 1898 saw two classes of priority
claims created. While the first class provided for satisfaction of tax claims, the second
WAGE PRIORITY
changes often have been necessitated by a failure of the courts to give
full effect to the wage priority provision. Thus in recommending an
amendment to make explicit the intent of Congress that the wages en-
titled to priority should include commissions, the House Judiciary Com-
mittee noted in 1937:
When this section of the Bankruptcy Act was enacted into law
the general practice in business was to pay traveling salesmen
a fixed wage for a definite period of time. Today the general
practice is to pay commissions. . . . A few referees have
recognized the justice of the commission salesman's claim against
the bankrupt estate by interpreting wages to include commis-
sions. This amendment would correct this ambiguity and then
no distinction may be made between the city or traveling sales-
man who earns a fixed wage during the period of employment
and those who earn an indefinite wage based upon the amount
of merchandise sold, and this part of section 64 will again
conform to its original intent and purpose.!
Arguably, fringe benefits are analogous inasmuch as they have become
an increasingly common form which remuneration now assumes. Again
in 1955, for example, Congressional action was essential to insure pro-
tection of salesmen who were independent contractors. Proposing the
change, the House Judiciary Committee evinced concern which has been
typical: "[L]anguage in some court cases has been confusing..
[T]here is language from which one might infer that a salesman who
was a 'separate contractor' could not qualify."8
class included a fourth priority for "wages due to workmen, clerks or servants, which
have been earned within three months before the date of the commencement of the
proceedings, not to exceed 300 dollars for each claimant." Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat.
563. In 1906, the protected category was broadened to include "traveling or city sales-
men." Act of June 15, 1906, 34 Stat. 267. The sum available to each claimant was
increased to 600 dollars in 1926. Act of May 27, 1926, 44 Stat. 667. The Chandler Act
of 1938 saw the priority, now second behind expenses of administration, expanded to
cover "workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city salesmen on a salary or commis-
sion basis, whole or part time, whether or not selling exclusively for the bankrupt."
Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 874. The definition of workers covered was clarified
further in 1956 by adding to the priority section the words "and for the purpose of this
clause, the term 'traveling or city salesmen' shall include all such salesmen, whether or
not they are independent contractors selling the products or services of the bankrupt
on a commission basis, with or without a drawing account or formal contract." 70
Stat. 725, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1964).
7. H. R. REP. No. 2355, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1937).
8. H.R. REP. No. 921, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1955). More recent judicial
construction of the Act has spurred no further changes affecting wage priority,
although considerable legislation has been proposed. H.R. 991, 89th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1965) ; H.R. 1784, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ; H.R. 66, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963) ;
H.R. 2274, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961) ; and H.R. 9831, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
H.R. 2076, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), a bill introduced by Rep. Leonard Farbstein of
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The history of legislative expansion of the wage priority section in
the face of restrictive judicial interpretation clearly supports the admoni-
tion of Justice Black, dissenting in Embassy, against "niggardly inter-
pretations of the language used in that section." 9  In the spirit of liberal
construction, courts long have found vacation pay,1" back pay1 and sev-
erance pay 2 to be within the scope of "wages . . . due to workmen."
Yet certain fringe benefits, which form an increasingly important part
of total compensation under collective bargaining agreements, usually
have been denied similar treatment."
New York, is representative of these attempts. It provides:
Be it enacted . . . that clause (2) of section 64a of the Bankruptcy Act
• . . is amended by striking out 'wages and commissions, not to exceed
$600 to each claimant, which have been earned within three months' and
inserting in lieu thereof the following; 'direct and indirect wages and com-
missions, not to exceed $2,000 with respect to each claimant, which have
been earned within three months (or in the case of vacation pay, severance
pay, and indirect wages, within twelve months).'
(1) The term 'indirect wages' means any sum payable by a bankrupt to a
trustee, insurance company, or other third party for pension, health insurance,
or other benefits for a person to whom direct wages have been paid or are
payable by the bankrupt.
The proposition that such proposed amendments reveal a belief that "indirect
wages" are not includable under the present language of the Act lends itself to facile
acceptance. The proper interpretation, however, may be that these proposals are-like
the amendments of 1938 and 1956-merely corrective devices to restore the "original
intent and purpose" of the Act thwarted by narrow judicial construction.
9. 359 U.S. at 37.
10. E.g., United States v. Monro-Van Helms Co. 243 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1957)
Division of Labor Law Enforcement v. Sampsell, 172 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1949);
Kavanas v. Mead, 171 F.2d 195 (4th Cir. 1948); In re Kinney Aluminum, 78 F. Supp.
565 (S.D. Cal. 1948).
11. E.g., Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952) (dictum); NLRB v. Killoren,
122 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 696 (1941).
12. E.g., McCloskey v. Divison of Labor Law Enforcement, 200 F.2d 402 (9th Cir.
1952). It re Men's Clothing Code Authority, 71 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
13. E.g., Embassy Restaurant, Inc. v. United States, 359 U.S. 29 (1959) ; In re
Victory Apparel Mfg. Corp., 154 F. Supp. 819 (D.N.J. 1957) ; In re Sleep Products,
Inc., 141 F. Supp. 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), afj'd sub nomn. Local 140 Sec. Fund v. Hack,
242 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 833 (1957), reh. denied, 358 U.S.
860 (1958) ; In re Brassel, 135 F. Supp. 827 (N.D.N.Y. 1955). Contra, Sulmeyer v.
Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Trust Fund, 301 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1962) ; In re Otto, 146
F. Supp. 787 (S.D. Cal. 1956); It. re Schmidt, 33 L.R.R.M. 2283 (S.D. Cal. 1953);
In re Ross, 117 F. Supp. 346 (N.D. Cal 1953). The latter is the only relevant case
which did not involve employer contributions pursuant to a collective bargaining
agreement. The wage deduction by the employer to provide insurance benefits in the
Ross case, like the vacation pay, back pay and severance pay cases, is not precisely
pertinent; for such payments are either (1) directly payable to the employee or (2)
deducted from wages. Thus, the question whether they are wages due to workmen is
not a difficult one. The question whether an employer's unpaid contributions to an
employee's fund under a private plan would be entitled to the priority does not seem
to have arisen, but the considerations would appear to be the same as in the cases
involving contributions under a collective bargaining pact. Likewise, the question
whether profit-sharing dividends and similar compensation devices would be entitled to
the priority has not been litigated, apparently rendered moot by the fact of bankruptcy.
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Typical of the rationale behind denying priority status to such claims
is the Court's opinion in Embassy. Embassy was required under collec-
tive bargaining agreements to contribute eight dollars per month per
full-time employee to trustees of welfare funds organized to provide life
insurance, weekly sick benefits, hospital and surgical benefits and other
advantages for members of the union. Each fund was administered un-
der a formal trust agreement by trustees who were authorized to estab-
lish the conditions of eligibility for benefits, control all the funds re-
ceived and collect all contributions. Title to all funds, property and in-
come was placed in the trustee exclusively, and no employee or anyone
claiming under him was to have any right in the plan. 4
In denying the trustees a wage priority for the employer's unpaid
contributions to the welfare fund, the Court stressed that the payments
did not fall within the fundamental purpose of the wage priority provi-
sion since they offered no support to the workmen in periods of financial
distress. The purpose of the section, wrote Justice Clark, was "to en-
able employees displaced by bankruptcy to secure, with some promptness,
the money directly due to them in back wages, and thus to alleviate in
some degree the hardships that nonemployment usually brings to workers
and their families."' 5
Moreover, the Court found, such contributions do not have the cus-
tomary attributes of "wages"; nor are they "due . . . to workmen."' 6
The Court noted that such payments were flat sums contributed without
reference to the employee's hours, wages or productivity. Stress was
placed on the contention that the payments were not "due . . . to work-
14. Various theories on which an individual interest in such funds might be
established are discussed in 66 YALE L.J. 449, 454-57 (1957). The comment surveys
assignment, third-party beneficiary and trust theories, rejecting the first and concluding:
Whether the employee has the right to sue the employer for nonpayment as
a third party beneficiary or whether the employee can sue the trustees for
breach of fiduciary duties created by the bargaining agreement, the unpaid
contributions are, in a very real sense, 'due to workmen.'
15. 359 U.S. at 32. A collection of various attempts to define the purpose of the
wage priority is found in 3 V. COLLIER, supra note 5, at § 64.201. See also In re
Paradise Catering Corp., 36 F. Supp. 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) ("Section 64, sub. a (2)
was enacted in order that workmen or servants, persons of menial position and low
income, should receive a priority in bankruptcy due to the fact that they, as a class,
could ill afford to be classified as general creditors") ; and 57 MIcH. L. REv. 403, 404
(1959) (". . . insuring economic security for workers rather than merely guaranteeing
them an emergency fund.").
16. 359 U.S. at 33.
17. Id. at 32. But priority has also been denied when the contribution was based
on a percentage of the employer's payroll for covered employees. See Annot., 17 A.L.R.
3d 374, 381-82 (1968). Nevertheless,the distinction between flat sum contributions and
contributions related to employee productivity was termed the ratio decidendi of the
Embassy decision in Sulmeyer v. Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Trust Fund, 301 F.2d
768 (9th Cir. 1962). See note 40 infra.
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men" since the employer's obligation was to contribute sums to the trus-
tees, not to its employees. 8
A further consideration in the Court's reasoning was the fact that,
if the claims of the trustees were to be treated on a par with wages, in a
case where the employer's assets were insufficient to pay all claims in the
wage priority the workman would have to share with the welfare plan,
thus reducing his own recovery."9
Finally, the Court noted that if Congress wished such fringe bene-
fits included under the wage priority, it could have included them spe-
cifically.2"
The majority view was strongly criticized by Justice Black, who re-
lied on a highly lucid lower court opinion in it re Otto.2' He stressed
that "compensation for services rendered" long has been held a valid defi-
nition of "wages" both in the priority section of the Bankruptcy Act and
in other contexts22 and that where such treatment has been deemed
18. 359 U.S. at 34. But see 52 Nw. U.L. REv. 681, 683 (1957). "Although
payment is not made to the employee, it is intended eventually as a direct benefit to
him. By means of welfare fund contributions the employer is paying an earned wage
for past services rendered and is attempting to insure future service of high quality and
extended duration." For similar views, see 20 U. PiTt. L. Rxv. 115, 119 (1953), 6
DUKE B.J. 121, 125 (1957), and 26 FORDHAM L. REv. 561, 563 (1957).
19. 359 U.S. at 33, 34. But see 13 VAND. L. REv. 376, 379 (1959). "The Court's
statement as to the competition which might arise between workmen's claims and the
contributions, should the contributions be included as wages, is not a valid reason for
not finding them to be wages. Insofar as it is support for strictly limiting the scope
of wages, however, a stronger argument could have been made. It is not difficult to
pose a situation, had the Court held otherwise, in which a qualified employee would be
deprived of a portion of his wage claim should he be independent of the union," and
as an added possible consequence of his independence would not be entitled to the
negotiated fringe benefits. In any event, such a consideration is inappropriate if a
proper interpretation of the Act permits such competition. Moreover, such a pre-
sumably undesirable result would obtain only when individual claims approached 600
dollars or whenever the assets of the estate would not permit all wage claims to be
paid in full. In all other cases, the effect would be to insure a fuller payment of the
agreed compensation. For an opposing view, see 42 MINN. L. REV. 294, 297-98 (1957).
20. 359 U.S. at 32.
21. 146 F. Supp. 787 (S.D. Cal. 1956). The wage priority was allowed for an
employer's unpaid contributions to a welfare fund used to purchase insurance benefits.
The court noted, "An employer's contributions to a welfare fund for the benefit of
employees and others ...and measured on the basis of a certain amount per hour
worked by employees, is but another method of computing and paying compensation for
services rendered; and accordingly should be held to be wages .. " Id. at 789.
22. 359 U.S. at 374 n.10. The cases cited characterized the following forms of
compensation as wages: payment for piece-work, rentals of company-owned housing to
employees and war bonuses. Only the first case concerned the Bankruptcy Act, however.
The problems in attempting to define a term used in one context by its definition in
another are noted in 32 TEMP. L.Q. 332 (1959). The author points out that the hazard of
interpretation by judicial construction of other statutes is that
it is more probable that neither Congress nor a State Legislature has in mind
a single notion of wages when enacting each statute in which the term
appears. If we are to determine the meaning of a term used by Congress
by comparing it to interpretations given to the same term as it appears in
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undesirable, Congress has expressly excluded fringe benefits from the
"wages" category.23
Justice Black considered the fact that the payments were used to
purchase insurance benefits irrelevant to the question of whether they
constituted "wages." 4 Nor, he added, do wages lose their identity simply
because the claim is asserted by someone other than the employee.2 5
Furthermore, he invoked authority for the proposition that payments to
welfare funds are as much "justly due" to the employees who have
earned them as are the wages payable directly to them in cash.2"
Despite the decision in Embassy, controversy over the scope of the
wage priority section has continued. In Sulmeyer v. Southern California
Pipe Trades Trust Fund, the priority given wages was accorded payments
due from a bankrupt employer to an employee's vacation and holiday
fund established under a collective bargaining agreement. The court
rejected the contention that Embassy controlled, distinguishing the cases
on the method of contribution and noting that each employee had a vested
right in the fund, with only the time of actual enjoyment being post-
other statutes without first inquiring into the policy of the particular statutes,
we are likely to fall into error.
Noting that "by analogy to the same statute diametrically opposite results may be
reached," the author advises that interpretation by analogy to other statutes should be
employed with caution.
23. 359 U.S. at 38 & n.12. Employer contributions to welfare funds expressly are
excluded from wages in the Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3121 (a)
(2) (1964); the Federal Employment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3306(b) (2) (1964);
and the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 409(b) (1964). Justice Black quotes Chief
justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827) at 438 to the
effect that, "... a rule of interpretation to which all assent [is] that the exception of a
particular thing from general words, proves that, in the opinion of the lawgiver, the
thing excepted would be within the general clause had the exception not been made...
24. 359 U.S. at 38 & n.13.
25. Id. at 38. The dissent relies on Shropshire, Woodliff & Co. v. Bush, 204 U.S.
186 (1907), which held that payments due an assignee of the worker were entitled to
priority as wages. Accord, In re Stultz Bros., 226 F. 989 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), In re Fuller
& Bennett, 152 F. 538 (S.D.W. Va. 1907). The majority's objection that "the debt was
never owed the workmen" seems irrelevant to Shropslire's authority that payments
which would be characterized as wages if paid directly to an employee cannot be denied
that status simply because they are paid to another. The possible necessity of finding an
assignment makes relevant In re Schmidt, 33 L.R.R.M. 2283 (S.D. Cal. 1953) which
held the collective bargaining agreement to be "at least an equitable assignment by the
employees" to the welfare fund. See also In re Ross, 117 F. Supp. 396 (S.D. Cal. 1953).
It was found that by entering into a voluntary plan of disability insurance and con-
senting to wage deductions for payment of disability insurance premiums, employees
made an enforceable assignment of a portion of their wages to the insurer. (Under state
law, an enforceable assignment could be made of wages under an existing employment.)
26. 359 U.S. at 39, 40. The dissent relied on United States ex rel Sherman v.
Carter, 353 U.S. 210 (1957), which construed the Miller Act, 40 U.S.C. § 270b(a)
(1964) to hold that payments to welfare funds are as much "justly due" to the
employees who have earned them as are wages payable directly to them in cash. The
majority's objection that Carter did not hold the payments to be "wages" fails to offset
that case's authority for the proposition that such payments are "due to workmen."
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poned. "Here," the court noted, "the contributions were seven and one
half percent of the gross pay of each employee, which is not a flat rate in
the same sense used in Embassy. . . . To the contrary, the amount here
contributed bears a direct relationship to the wages earned, varying with
each employee's productivity and . . . responsibility."27
A similar attempt to distinguish the Embassy decision was found
unpersuasive in the Joint Board case. Each employer of union repre-
sented workers had been required to contribute four dollars for each day's
wages paid to each such worker to trustees of an annuity plan established
by a collective bargaining pact. Each worker for whom such contribu-
tions were made, or his designated beneficiary, was entitled to receive
monthly payments of specified amounts, to the full extent of sums cred-
ited to his account, upon the following contingencies: death of the em-
ployee, retirement from the industry at age sixty or over, permanent
disability after working more than ten years for a contributing employer,
entry into the armed forces or cessation of participation by leaving the
industry or accepting employment with a company not covered by the
agreement.
Echoing Sulmeyer, Justice Fortas, dissenting in the Joint Board case,
noted that the basis for contributions, accounting method and the nature
of the employee's interest all distinguished this case from Embassy.28
Whereas, in the latter case contributions consisted of flat sums for each
workman, without regard to his hours, wages or productivity, in the
former the sum due each employee's account was specifically related to
and measured by his hours of work.2" In Embassy payments were not
27. 301 F.2d 768, 771 n.3 (1962). The court went on to observe that the facts of
the case aligned it more closely with Shropshire and Otto than with Embassy. The
attempt of the Court of Appeals in Joint Board (In re A & S Electric Corp., 379
F.2d 211, 212 n.1 (2d Cir. 1967)) to derogate the authority of Sulneyer by noting that
vacation pay has always been considered wages glosses over the point that both cases
concerned employer contributions to a fund established for the benefit of employees. In
cases where vacation pay traditionally has been accorded the priority, such payments
were due the employee directly from the employer as compensation for services rendered.
Sulyneyer extends the priority to an employer's unpaid contributions to a vacation and
holiday fund established pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Since it cannot
be maintained seriously that the question turns on the use the employee will make of the
payments, the fact that the payments were made to a particular type of fund appears
unimportant. Suhneyer thus emerges as authority for the proposition that an employer's
unpaid contributions to an employee's fund will, under the specified conditions, be
entitled to the wage priority. For a state court decision ignoring Emibassy and relying
on Otto in construing payments to an employee's welfare fund to constitute "wages,"
see Tracy v. Contractors State License Bd., 63 Cal. 2d 598, 407 P.2d 865, 47 Cal. Rptr.
561 (1965). The court held that sums due from a contractor to employees' pension,
health and welfare, and vacation funds were "wages" within the meaning of the
Bankruptcy Act and could receive special attention as a preferred claim in bankruptcy
in imposing penalties for violation of the Contractor's License Law.
28. 391 U.S. at 230.
29. See note 40, infra.
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credited to the individual employee but were used to provide life insur-
ance, sick benefits, hospital and surgical payments, and other benefits
for all employees; while in Joint Board the sum which each employee
earned was accounted for separately and individually, and he was entitled
to that sum. Moreover, in the earlier case the employee was not entitled
to demand and receive payment of stums earned by him; in the later case,
however, on the occurrence of specified events, the employee or his estate
was entitled to receive in full the sums remitted to the trustee.
The dissent rejected the majority's proposition that the priority was
intended only to alleviate the hardship of unemployment following im-
mediately upon the bankruptcy of an employer by noting that a priority
position cannot insure immediate payment but only enhances the prospects
for eventual recovery.3" In any event, the dissent concluded, payments
to the annuity fund would qualify even under the majority's definition
of the wage priority's purpose since they serve to alleviate the hardship
of unattractive employment outside the industry or with an employer not
covered by the plan following a discharge caused by bankruptcy."'
The Supreme Court's ruling in Joint Board will, in the event of
bankruptcy proceedings, prejudice considerably an employee's prospects of
ever receiving a substantial portion of the total compensation agreed up-
on through collective bargaining. It threatens to deny the wage priority
to every form of compensation except direct cash remuneration at a time
when diversified forms of compensation are becoming increasingly popu-
lar.32  Such a result could have been avoided either by repudiating
Embassy3 or by finding that the factual distinctions between Joint Board
and Embassy warranted a different result. Inasmuch as Embassy is the
30. 359 U.S. at 232, 233.
31. Id. at 233 n.2.
32. Expenditures for social and private welfare plans covering nonagricultural
employees rose forty-two per cent (from 6.5 per cent to 9.2 per cent of wages and
salaries) in the decade since 1955. Recent studies indicate that all forms of indirect
compensation account for from twenty to twenty-five per cent of total compensation
paid by employers for factory workers. Strasser, Wages, Wage Supplements and
Labor Cornpensation,, 17 LABOR L.J. 387, 389 (1966).
33. For a view that reversing the "long standing and incontrovertible decisions"
preceding the Embassy decision would be unjustifiable, see 34 CHI.-KENT L. Rav. 235,
238-39 (1956). Discussing It re Brassel, 135 F. Supp. 827 (N.D.N.Y. 1955), the
author contended that
the claimant was not a workmen . . . the sum claimed did not represent
wages . . . and the amount payable . . . formed no more than a contractual
obligation owed to a third person. No degree of liberality . . . could justify
the amount of nullification in the language of the Act . . . which would be
necessary before a claim of the kind asserted could be upheld. If the fringe
benefits now common under modern mass employment contracts are to be
protected against the impact of bankruptcy, substantial revision would have
to be made both in the statutory language and in the fundamental concepts
concerning priorities.
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sole authority for the later decision, both would appear to be equally
proper targets for the well-founded criticisms levelled by the dissenting
justices. To the extent that the facts of the Joint Board case afford a
less appropriate base upon which to predicate the type of analysis em-
ployed by the Court in Embassy, the second decision appears correspond-
ingly less well-founded.
As authority for the proposition that employer contributions com-
puted on a flat rate without relation to the employee's work and to which
the employee has no immediate or prospective right are not entitled to
the wage priority, the Embassy decision warrants no further discussion.
So construed, that case should not prevent the accomplishment of sub-
stantial justice in similar, but factually distinguishable, cases. Conversely,
if the principal case indicates a trend toward a broadened application of
the Embassy rule, the popularity of certain fringe benefits, and employee
confidence therein, well may be threatened.
An effort to develop a rationale to avert such consequences might be
no more than an academic exercise if the Joint Board case were to be con-
sidered dispositive of the wage priority issue. However, it is inferrible
that the issue is open to further development given the fact that the
Embassy--Joint Board majority position, considered as a whole, argu-
ably fails to win the approval of a majority of the members of the present
Supreme Court.34 The dissenters in Embassy (Chief Justice Warren,
Justice Black and Justice Douglas), added to the additional dissenters
in Joint Board (Justices Fortas and Brennan) constitute a potential ma-
jority for a case properly distinguishable from Embassy and Joint Board.
One can only speculate on the reasons why Justices Black and Douglas
failed to dissent in Joint Board, as they did in Embassy. Perhaps they
have come to endorse the majority view in the earlier case. More likely,
however, they have determined to let the Embassy decision-whatever its
merits-prevail after nearly a decade of Congressional inattention to cor-
rective legislation. Considering Joint Board to be insufficiently dis-
tinguishable from the earlier case, they then properly could join the ma-
jority in the later case. In a future case with what Justice Douglas
terms "a slightly different shade of facts,"3 these justices could conceiv-
34. The fact that the Court agreed to review Joint Board gives additional weight
to the inference that Embassy does not settle all aspects of the wage priority question.
Moreover, rather than disposing of the case in a memorandum decision, the Court
found it necessary to explain why the instant case fell under the Embassy rule. Such
factors perhaps suggest that the Court is sensitive to factual distinctions which might
bring a case outside the scope of the Embassy decision.
35. W. DOUGLAS, STARE DEcIsis 8 (1949) :
It is easy to overemphasize stare decisis as a principle in the lives of men.
Even for the experts law is only a prediction of what judges will do under
a given set of facts-a prediction that makes rules of law on decisions not
WAGE PRIORITY
ably join the Joint Board dissenters to extend the wage priority to claims
for certain fringe benefits. It therefore becomes meaningful to explore
the types of situations in which the priority could be extended consistent
with existing case law.
Criteria which employer contributions must meet in order to qualify
for the wage preference are discernible from the Embassy decision. They
must either have the customary attributes of wages and be due to work-
men, or satisfy the purpose for which Congress created the priority. In
assuming that the purpose of Congress in enacting the priority was to
provide immediate support to workmen during periods of financial dis-
tress, the Court has established a criterion which neither fringe benefits
nor direct wages can satisfy. 6 Granting a claim priority does not serve
the purpose of assuring immediate payment, for such payment must await
the interim or final distribution of the estate. To ascribe this broad
purpose is to conclude that Congress provided for immediate relief with
one hand and took it away with the other by erecting procedural barriers
to the immediate settlement of the bankrupt's estate." Such priority
status, however, does function to increase the prospects for eventual
recovery; it is reasonable to assume that such enhancement is its purpose. 8
Thus defined, the purpose of the wage priority provision is of no
aid in determining what forms of compensation are entitled to the wage
priority. The proper inquiry thus becomes what types of fringe bene-
fits comport with Embassy's other criterion. If Congress wishes to en-
hance the chances for payment of wage claims without regard to whether
logical deductions but functions of human behavior. There are usually plenty
of precedents to go around; and with the accumulation of decisions, it is no
great problem for the lawyer to find legal authority for most propositions. The
difficulty is to estimate what effect a slightly different shade of facts will have
and to predict the speed of the current in a changing stream of the law.
36. Even if ameliorating the financial shock of unemployment were the original
intent of Congress in enacting the wage priority, that function has been pre-empted by
unemployment compensation. Failure to limit the wage priority correspondingly suggests
Congressional intent that an expanded purpose should now be ascribed to the
provision, according to 66 YALE L.J. 449, 461 (1957).
37. Payment of a wage priority claim must await adjudication of bankruptcy,
creditor meetings and proof of claims as well as a determination by the trustee that
sufficient assets exist to pay the costs of administration.
38. The rationale behind the priority provision was explained in H.R. REP. No.
687, 89th 'Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1965) as follows:
Under the Bankruptcy Act, certain types of unsecured claims are given a
statutory advantage in the distribution of the bankrupt's estate. These
priority claimants are to be distinguished from the secured creditor who has
a property right which entitles him to be paid out of the assets against
which the security attaches. The priority claimant, on the other hand is an
unsecured creditor who, by law, as a matter of social policy, has been placed
in a position superior to that of the unsecured creditors. Thus, administrative
expenses, wage claims, taxes and rent claims where State law gives a priority
to landlords, are all paid before general creditors may share in the distribution
under the Bankruptcy Act.
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such payments provide immediate support during a financial crisis, it
seems violative of that purpose to distinguish wages payable directly to
the employee from those employer contributions which are, in effect,
deferred wage payments when determining which payments have the
customary attributes of wages and are due to workmen.
The proper approach would appear to be to distinguish such contri-
butions on the basis of whether they: are paid in lieu of present cash
remuneration, as opposed to being mere conditions of employment ;39 are
computed on the basis of the individual employee's work, as opposed to
being mere flat sums for each workman ;40 are credited to each employee's
individual account, as opposed to being absorbed into a general fund ;4"
and are payable on demand to the employee-to the full extent of funds
credited to his individual account-at some specified time, as opposed to
merely affording certain benefits to the employee on the occurrence of
certain contingent events.2
Satisfaction of the first two tests would establish that the forms of
indirect compensation have the customary attributes of wages, while ful-
filling the latter two requisites would substantiate an averment that the
payments are due to workmen. In view of the manifest equivalence of
such payments to direct "wages . . . due to workmen," to deny the
39. This criterion would meet the Embassy objection that "not all types of
obligations due employees from their employers are . . . within the concept of wages,
even though having some relation to employment." 359 U.S. at 32. Not all fringe
benefits are intended to be in lieu of additional compensation which might otherwise be
paid to union members for work performed, although they may represent further
consideration for the entire collective bargaining agreement. For a discussion of the
subject and examples of employer obligations outside the concept of wages, such as
workmen's compensation, see Forman, supra note 2, at 322, and a speech by Arthur
J. Goldberg, quoted in 32 TEMP. L.Q. 332, 341 (1959). The thoughtful reader will agree
with Mr. Goldberg's observations as to the frequent difficulty in distinguishing between
wages paid in lieu of cash and wages representing mere conditions of employment.
40. This distinction would preclude Embassy's objection that the payment was
without relation to hours, wages or productivity. 359 U.S. at 32. That the Joint Board
case admittedly is not as strong on this point as is Sulneyer could be used to explain
the holding. A contribution of four dollars for each day worked by an employee, as in
Joint Board, seems only slightly more closely related to individual productivity than
the eight dollars per month for each full-time employee in Embassy.The Joint Board
formula, however, appears closer to the contribution method in cases which have granted
the priority (In re Otto-five cents for each hour worked; In re Schinidt-6%
cents for each hour worked) than it does to those which have denied it (In re Victory
Apparel Mfg. Corp.; Local 140 Sec. Fund. v. Hack; It re Brassel-all based on a
percentage of the gross reportable payroll of employees in the bargaining unit.). The
Sunlmeyer formula (7V per cent of the gross pay of each employee) clearly is most
closely related to the individual's hours, wages and productivity.
41. Satisfying this criterion eliminates Embassy's objection that the employer's
obligation "is to contribute sums to the trustees, not to its workmen" (359 U.S. at 33)
by clarifying the individual interest held by the trustees for the employee under a
fiduciary obligation.
42. Such a distinction further eradicates Embassy's objection that the employee
has no individual legal interest in the fund. 359 U.S. at 32-33.
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wage preference to these forms of compensation would be "[t]o dis-
regard the natural implications of the statute and to imprison our read-
ing of it in the shell of the mere words," an approach which Justice
Frankfurter termed "the cardinal sin in statutory construction, 'blind
literalness.' ""
Should judicial inquiry result in an affirmative finding on each of
these four points, the case law could support a recognition of wage
priority status for the claim without doing violence to the real import of
the Embassy and Joint Board decisions.4 Such an approach would pre-
serve judicial flexibility in dealing with the varying cases which arise
in this area of public concern. Moreover, express adoption of such
criteria in future decisions would have the beneficial effect of provid-
ing guidelines meaningful in the drafting or revision of future collec-
tive bargaining agreements on fringe benefits.
Gary D. Spivey
43. Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 345 U.S. 379, 392 (1953). See also Strasser,
supra note 32, at 389:
Whether wage payments, computed on the basis of time worked or units
produced, and supplementary compensation payments made by employers are or
are not opposite sides of the same coin has been argued for years. Much of the
disagreement has been the result of semantic rather than pragmatic problems.
Regardless of the semantic confusion prevalent in almost any discussion of
wage supplements or fringe benefits, American labor and management have
tended, at least in the more recent years, to agree that labor negotiations on
economic issues are settled within the framework of the cost of the entire
package (that is, wages plus wage supplements).
The Embassy protest that "we deal with a statute, not business practice" (359 U.S. at
33) fails to recognize adequately the demonstrable Congressional intention to reconcile
interpretations of the Act with current business practice. See text accompanying note
7 supra.
Moreover, as noted in 6 DuxE B.J. 121, 127 (1957): "Where fringe benefits are
bargained for and received in lieu of cash wages, they should not be subjected to
archaic tests but should rather be considered in the light of present-day labor conditions."
44. Sidineyer is the clearest example of a satisfaction of all four criteria. Employee
welfare funds could easily be brought within the first three criteria and could satisfy
the fourth by such devices as providing for conversion to individual insurance policies
when the employee ceases to be a participant under the plan. Compliance with these
criteria would appear to remove the major objections noted in cases denying the
wage priority.
